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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Sebelius v. Cloer,
133 S. Ct. 1886 (2013)
Synopsis:
Under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986
(NCVIA, or the “Act”), 1 an injured claimant may recover
compensation paid out from a federal trust fund for a vaccine-related
injury, provided that the claimant’s petition is filed within thirty-six
months after the date of the injury. 2 A court may award attorneys’
fees to a claimant who files a petition in good faith and upon “a
reasonable basis for the claim for which the petition was brought.” 3
The claimant, Dr. Melissa Cloer, did not file her petition for
compensation within the statutory period of thirty-six months of the
first symptoms of her illness. 4 The issue that ultimately reached the
U.S. Supreme Court was whether Cloer was entitled to reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs in connection with her untimely petition. 5
The Supreme Court, in a 9–0 decision, affirmed the en banc Federal
Circuit’s opinion, which allows such awards for untimely petitions
under the NCVIA. 6

1

42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (2006).
Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1890 (2013).
3
Id.
4
Id. The statute provides:
2

[I]f a vaccine-related injury occurred as a result of the
administration of such vaccine, no petition may be filed for
compensation under the Program for such injury after the
expiration of 36 months after the date of the occurrence of the
first symptom or manifestation of onset or of the significant
aggravation of such injury . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(a)(2).
5
Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 1892.
6
Id.; Cloer v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 675 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 638 (2012), aff’d sub nom. Sebelius v. Cloer, 133
S. Ct. 1886 (2013).
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Facts, Analysis, Ruling:
From September 1996 to April 1997, Cloer received three
Hepatitis-B immunizations and began to experience symptoms of
numbness and strange sensations about a month after the final
vaccination. 7 The symptoms “waxed and waned” throughout the
subsequent years and Cloer sought treatment in 1998 and 1999 from
two neurologists. 8 However, she was not diagnosed with multiple
sclerosis (MS) until late 2003, when she began to experience the full
manifestations of the demyelinating disease.9 Cloer learned of the
link between MS and the Hepatitis-B vaccine in 2004 and filed a
claim for compensation under NCVIA in September 2005. 10 Her
petition alleged that the vaccinations she received had caused or
exacerbated her MS. 11
The sole procedure for reviewing a vaccine claim brought
under NCVIA begins at the Court of Federal Claims’ Office of
Special Masters. 12 The chief special master assigned by the Court of
Federal Claims to Cloer’s petition determined that her claim was
untimely because the thirty-six-month limitations period of the
NCVIA began to run in 1997, when she first experienced MS
symptoms. 13 The legal basis of the special master’s determination
was section 300aa-16 of the Act, which states that “no petition may
be filed for compensation under the Program for such injury after the
expiration of 36 months after the date of the occurrence of the first
symptom or manifestation of onset or of the significant aggravation

7

Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 1892; Cloer v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 85
Fed. Cl. 141, 143 (Fed. Cl. 2008), rev’d, 603 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 665
F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir .2011).
8
Cloer, 85 Fed. Cl. at 144.
9
Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 1892. Cloer was given a “provisional diagnosis” of
MS. Cloer, 85 Fed. Cl. at 144.
10
Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 1892.
11
Id.
12
Vaccine Claims/Office of Special Masters, U.S. COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS,
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/vaccine-programoffice-special-masters (last visited
Feb. 26, 2014); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(a) (providing that the U.S. Court of
Federal Claims and its special masters shall have jurisdiction to determine whether
a petitioner is entitled to compensation and the amount of compensation under the
NCVIA program).
13
Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 1892.
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of such injury.” 14 Cloer appealed the issue of timeliness, and the
Federal Circuit panel agreed with her that the statute of limitations
period began to run in September 2004, the earliest date when the
medical community at large was put on notice in regards to the link
between MS and the vaccine. 15 The en banc Federal Circuit
reversed, holding that Cloer’s petition was untimely, citing the
language of 300aa-16. 16 However, the en banc court did grant Cloer
her motion for attorneys’ fees, quoting section 300aa-15(e)(1) for the
provision of providing “reasonable attorneys’ fees and other costs . . .
if the special master or court determines that that petition was
brought in good faith and there was a reasonable basis for the claim
for which the petition was brought.” 17 The Government submitted a
petition for writ of certiorari, and upon review, the Supreme Court
affirmed the grant of attorneys’ fees to Cloer.18
First, the Government argued the Act’s thirty-six-month
statutory limitation for filing a petition was a statutory prerequisite to
obtaining compensation from the program. 19 In other words, only
timely petitions were considered to be “filed.” 20 The Court stated
that it found no textual support for this argument, 21 and held that a

14

42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(a)(2) (2006). The special master cited Federal Circuit
cases that were waivers of the United States’ sovereign immunity, such as the
Vaccine Act, and emphases that such waivers “must be strictly and narrowly
construed.” This meant that “subtle” symptoms or manifestations of onset trigger
the statute of limitations for the Act. Cloer v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
No. 05-1002V, 2008 WL 2275574, at *4, *5 (Fed. Cl. May 15, 2008), aff’d, 85
Fed. Cl. 141 (Fed. Cl. 2008), rev’d, 603 F.3d 1341 (Fed Cir. 2010), aff’d, 654 F.3d
1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
15
Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 1892. September 2004 was when an article on the
causal link between MS and a vaccine was published in the medical periodical,
Neurology. Cloer v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 603 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed.
Cir. 2010).
16
Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 1892.
17
Id. (quoting section 300aa-15(e)(1)).
18
Id.
19
Id. at 1893.
20
See id. at 1894 (“[T]o adopt the Government's position, we would have to
conclude that a petition like Dr. Cloer's, which was ‘filed’ under the ordinary
meaning of that term but was later found to be untimely, was never filed at all
because, on the Government's reading, ‘no petition may be filed for compensation’
late.”).
21
Id.
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“petition filed in violation of the limitations period . . . is still a
petition filed under § 300aa-11(a)(1),” and thus subject to the
attorneys’ fees provision under section 300aa-15(e)(1). 22 Second, the
Court indicated that the lack of cross-reference to the limitations
period in the relevant sections was further evidence of Congress’s
lack of intent to exclude untimely petitions from the award of
attorneys’ fees. 23 Third, the Court stated, it would be inconsistent to
read “filed” as limited to those petitions that were submitted within
the limitations period; there were “numerous instances throughout the
NCVIA” where “filed” is meant to include untimely petitions as
well. 24 For example, section 300aa-12(b)(2) requires the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to publish notice of any petition filed
under section 300aa-11 in the Federal Register within thirty days of
receiving service for such a petition. 25 If the Government’s narrow
reading of “filed” applies, then it is expected of the Secretary to
strike untimely petitions from the Federal Register, but the Secretary
does not make such exclusions in the publications. 26 Based on the
preceding statutory analysis, the Court was satisfied that the statutory
language was “unambiguous” in allowing untimely petitions brought
in good faith, “like any other unsuccessful petition,” to receive
attorneys’ fees. 27
Lastly, the Court pointed out that the
Government’s reading was contrary to the goals of the fee provisions

22

Id. at 1893–94.
Id. at 1894. The Court cited Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29–30
(1997), for the proposition that it is “generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely” when it “includes particular language in one section of
a statute but omits it in another section.” Id. The Court found it significant that
compliance with the NCVIA limitations period was expressly provided in section
300aa-11(a)(2)(A), which prevented claimants from suing vaccine manufacturers
unless the petition complied with the section 300aa-16 limitations period. Id.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 1894–95.
26
Id. at 1895. Interestingly, the discussion of this requirement before the
Court revealed that the Department of Health and Human Services had “not been
complying with that provision for the last few years”; but when it was last
complied with, “it included timely and untimely filings in the published list.”
Ronald Mann, Argument Recap: Justices Dubious of Limits on Attorney’s Fees in
(Mar.
21,
2013,
10:25
AM),
Vaccine
Cases,
SCOTUSBLOG
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/03/argument-recap-justices-dubious-of-limits-onattorneys-fees-in-vaccine-cases/.
27
Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 1895.
23
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because Congress had stated that the purpose of the fees scheme was
to enable claimants to launch good-faith claims, regardless of
whether the claims ultimately prevailed or not. 28
Impact:
The 9–0 majority opinion delivered by Justice Sotomayor is a
signal that the statutory language of the NCVIA was clear in its goal
of reducing the financial burden on victims of vaccine injuries, 29 and
thus the Court owed no level of deference to the implementing
agency’s interpretation of the statute. 30 Indeed, Congress enacted the
NCVIA to set up a no-fault compensation program to circumvent the
“inefficiencies and costs” of litigating vaccine injuries that burdened
injured parties and vaccine manufacturers. 31 Sebelius is an important
decision made by the Court to maintain the efficiency and
accessibility that Congress sought to create in the civil tort system in
this area of litigation. 32

Vance v. Ball State University,
133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013)
Synopsis:
Petitioner Maetta Vance brought a Title VII action against her
employer, respondent Ball State University (BSU), claiming BSU
was vicariously liable for a fellow employee’s creation of a racially
hostile work environment. 33 Under Title VII, an employer’s liability
for such harassment depends on whether the harasser is a
“supervisor.” 34 Where the supervisor’s harassment is characterized
28

Id.
See id.
30
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984) (holding where Congress’s intent is clear, the court and the agency are
required to follow Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent).
31
Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 1890.
32
See id. (stating that the system was “designed to work faster and with greater
ease than the civil tort system”).
33
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439–40 (2013).
34
Id. at 2439.
29
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as “tangible employment actions,” the employer is strictly liable for
the harasser’s actions. 35 Where a non-supervisorial employee
commits the harassment, the accuser has the additional burden of
proving that the employer was “negligent in controlling working
conditions” before vicarious liability may attach to the employer. 36
In their 2006 pleadings filed with the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Vance and BSU disputed the issue of
whether or not Vance’s harasser was her supervisor for purposes of
Title VII. 37 The district court held in BSU’s favor, finding Vance’s
harasser was not a supervisor under the Seventh Circuit’s definition,
which requires supervisors to possess “the power to hire, fire,
demote, promote, transfer, or discipline an employee.” 38 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding steady to its established precedent
that was in conflict with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s (EEOC) standard. 39 The U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari to provide guidance for lower courts. 40
Facts, Analysis, Ruling:
Vance, an African-American woman, worked as a full-time
catering assistant at a division of BSU’s dining services. 41 In late
2005 and early 2006, Vance filed internal complaints and charges
with the EEOC against BSU. 42 Among her complaints and charges
of racial harassment and retaliation, many pertained to a Caucasian
female employee, Saundra Davis, who served as a catering specialist

35

Id.
Id.
37
Id. at 2440.
38
Id. (quoting Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 335 (7th Cir. 2002)).
39
Id. at 2443. The Second and Fourth Circuits follow the EEOC’s standard,
while the First, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have advocated for the bright-line rule
of defining a supervisor as one who has “the power to hire, fire, demote, promote,
transfer, or discipline the victim.” Id.
40
Id. The Court was notably concerned about providing “reasonably clear jury
instructions in employment discrimination cases,” citing the opinions of courts and
commentators. Id. at 2451; see also id. at 2451 n.13 (citing cases and law articles
that discuss the necessity of simplified, straightforward jury instructions in
employment discrimination cases).
41
Id. at 2439.
42
Id.
36
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in Vance’s division. 43 BSU attempted to address the problem but
was unsuccessful in resolving the grievances and Vance filed suit in
federal district court in 2006. 44 Her complaint alleged that Davis was
her supervisor and BSU was vicariously liable for the racially hostile
work environment that Davis created. 45 The district court found
against Vance in summary judgment, holding that BSU was not
vicariously liable because Davis was not Vance’s supervisor under
the “hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline” standard of
the Seventh Circuit; and moreover, BSU was not liable in negligence
“because it responded reasonably to the incidents of which it was
aware.” 46 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the ruling. 47
At the U.S. Supreme Court, Vance argued that the general
and legal usage of “supervisor” supported her claim that Davis was
her supervisor. 48 As the Court noted, a dictionary entry defines the
term as “one who inspects and directs the work of others.” 49 Vance
pointed out that Davis’s job description gave her leadership
responsibilities, and there was evidence that Vance and other kitchen
employees were “at times led or directed” by Davis. 50 However, the
Court was able to show that varying uses of the word in other
dictionaries and legal authority existed so as to arrive at the
conclusion that Vance’s argument was not compelling. 51
The Court then discussed at length its previously-established
framework of when an employer can be vicariously liable, 52
43

Id.
Id. at 2440.
45
Id.
46
Id. (citing Vance v. Ball State Univ., 2008 WL 4247836, at *15–16 (S.D.
Ind. Sept. 8, 2010)).
47
Id.
48
Id. at 2444.
49
Id. (quoting 17 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 245 (2d ed. 1989)).
50
Id. at 2449.
51
Id. at 2444–46.
52
The framework was laid out in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). In
Ellerth, the employer hired his victim and promoted her, but subjected her to sexual
harassment. 524 U.S. at 742. The Court held that an employee who does not suffer
tangible job consequences as a result of actionable discrimination may nonetheless
hold the employer strictly liable, but the employer may raise an affirmative
defense. Id. The Seventh Circuit did not have any trouble characterizing the
harasser in Ellerth as the victim’s supervisor. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2446.
44

240
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concluding that the “defining characteristic” of a supervisor is the
ability to “cause ‘direct economic harm’ by taking a tangible
employment action.” 53 Thus, under the existing framework, it was
appropriate to adopt the Seventh Circuit’s bright-line rule that a
showing of a tangible employment action against the victim—i.e., “a
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing,
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits” 54—is required before vicarious liability can attach. 55
The Court bolstered its adoption of the bright-line rule with a
policy discussion that emphasized the reasons it rejected the EEOC’s
definition, 56 which the Court called “a study in ambiguity.” 57 The
Court pointed to the EEOC’s position elaborated in both the
Government’s Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae (U.S.
Brief), 58 as well as the EEOC’s publication, 59 entitled Enforcement
Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by
Supervisors. 60 The EEOC defined “supervisor” as one who “has
authority to undertake or recommend tangible employment decisions
In Faragher, the victim was a female lifeguard who sued the city of Boca
Raton for sexual harassment based on the theory of vicarious liability. 524 U.S. at
775. The Court held that there is strict liability if the supervisor is the harasser, but
the employer may present an affirmative defense. Id. As in Ellerth, it was not
disputed that the harassers were the victim’s supervisors. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at
2447.
53
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2448 (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762).
54
Id. at 2442 (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761).
55
Id. at 2454. In essence, the Court believes that vicarious liability is justified
where there are tangible employment actions, as those “are the means by which the
supervisor brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates.” Id.
at 2448 (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762).
56
Id. at 2450.
57
Id. at 2449.
58
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 9,
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2012) (No. 11-556).
59
Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful
Harassment
by
Supervisors,
EEOC
(June
18,
1999),
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html [hereinafter EEOC Guidance].
60
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2449. As with Title VII claims generally, the EEOC’s
definition of “supervisor” in the context of an actionable harassment requires an
inquiry in the “surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships.” Id. at
2463 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,
Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998)).
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affecting the employee,” or one who “has authority to direct the
employee’s daily work activities.”61 Additionally, a supervisor’s
authority must be “of sufficient magnitude so as to assist the harasser
explicitly or implicitly in carrying out the harassment.” 62 The Court
was especially concerned that this definition was “ill-defined” and
the vagueness of this standard would complicate harassment cases. 63
Thus, in adopting the Seventh Circuit’s bright-line rule, the Court
was assured that it had simplified an important issue in employment
discrimination cases. 64 With this rule, the issue of vicarious liability
can easily “be resolved as a matter of law before trial”; 65 and even
where supervisorial status is disputed as a matter of fact—i.e., the
parties have a genuine dispute about whether the alleged harasser a
supervisor or not for purposes of Title VII—it is a “relatively
straightforward” preliminary question that can be easily presented to
the jurors. 66
Impact:
In the majority opinion by Justice Alito, there was notably a
lack of discussion about how much weight the Court should give to
the EEOC’s definition. 67 In her dissent, Justice Ginsberg noted that
the Court, as a general rule, affords Skidmore deference to the
EEOC’s guidelines, which respects the agency’s definition to the
extent that it is persuasive. 68 The dissent pointed out that the EEOC
61

EEOC Guidance, supra note 59.
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2449 (quoting U.S. Brief at 27; EEOC Guidance).
63
Id. at 2449–50. Specifically, the Court feared that “[a]pplying these
standards would present daunting problems for the lower federal courts and for
juries.” Id. at 2450.
64
Id. at 2450.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
See id. at 2449–50. The Court analyzed the merits of the EEOC definition
without considering the EEOC’s expertise in relevant areas of the law and without
considering how the EEOC arrived at its definition. Id. at 2461–62 (Ginsberg, J.,
dissenting).
68
Id. at 2461. The Court in Skidmore recognizes an administrative agency’s
persuasive power:
62

We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the
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had the “informed judgment” and “body of experience” in enforcing
Title VII, and that it had adhered to its definition of “supervisor” for
fourteen years based on the Court’s guidance provided in Ellerth and
Faragher. 69 Furthermore, the EEOC’s formulation of the rule
reasonably ensured that ordinary employees would not be treated as
supervisors for the purposes of ascertaining the liability of the
employer. 70 The dissent deemed the majority’s chosen definition as
one that “undermine[s] Title VII’s capacity to prevent workplace
harassment,” 71 and questioned the “workability” of the Court’s
definition. 72 Specifically, the dissent argued that the majority’s
definition was so limiting that it does not reflect the reality of
workplace: that “[s]upervisors, like the workplaces they manage,
come in all shapes and sizes.” 73 Thus, those supervisors that have the
ability to assign unpleasant tasks or alter the work environment of a
fellow employee in objectionable ways may be able to escape
liability simply because the supervisor lacks the authority to take
tangible employment actions. 74
With the concerns of the dissent in mind, the impact of the
case is two-fold: not only has the Court created precedent that
diverges from Skidmore’s mandate, affecting the ability of
administrative agencies to enforce their regulatory policies, the Court
has also simplified some of the complexity in adjudicating

courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants
may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment
in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
69
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2461 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
70
See id. at 2461–62 (discussing how the EEOC’s standard applies).
71
Id. at 2463.
72
Id. at 2463 n.6.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 2451 (majority opinion). If the harasser is not deemed a supervisor of
the victim; the plaintiff-victim will not be able to argue strict liability but instead
must prove negligence.
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employment harassment cases—and perhaps, in the interest of
efficiency, weakened the mandate of Title VII.75

Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett,
133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013)
Synopsis:
Respondent Karen Bartlett suffered significant injuries
resulting from her use of an inflammatory pain reliever manufactured
by the generic drug manufacturer, petitioner Mutual Pharmaceutical
(Mutual). 76 Bartlett alleged that New Hampshire’s design-defect
cause of action required Mutual to change the drug’s labeling to
provide stronger warnings, which Mutual failed to do. 77 The jury in
federal district court awarded Bartlett $21.06 million in
compensatory damages on a design-defect claim under New
Hampshire tort law, 78 a ruling that was upheld by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit. 79 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the
judgment, holding that New Hampshire’s design-defect claim was
directly in conflict with the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA), 80 which, by operation of preemption, prohibited Mutual
from providing a stronger label warning. 81

75

See id. at 2466 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (voicing the hope that Congress
will “restore the robust protections against workplace harassment the Court
weakens” with the Vance ruling).
76
Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2013).
77
Id. at 2470.
78
Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 760 F. Supp. 2d 220 (D.N.H. 2011), aff’d, 678
F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
79
Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct.
2466 (2013).
80
The FDCA requires drug manufacturers to “gain approval from the United
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before marketing any drug in
interstate commerce.” Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2470.
81
Id.
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Facts, Analysis, Ruling:
In December 2004, Bartlett took a generic form of sulindac
manufactured by Mutual to address her shoulder pain. 82 In response
to the drug, Bartlett soon developed toxic epidermal necrolysis,
which deteriorated sixty-five percent of her skin and resulted in
severe disfigurement, physical disabilities, and near-blindness. 83
Bartlett filed suit in state court, alleging claims for failure-to-warn
and design-defect. 84 Mutual removed the suit to federal court, where
the jury awarded damages to Bartlett based on her design-defect
claim. 85 Mutual appealed, arguing that New Hampshire’s tort law
was preempted by the FDCA, the Hatch–Waxman Act, and the
FDCA’s regulations. 86
Specifically, New Hampshire law imposes a duty on
manufacturers not to sell “any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.” 87 It is a strict
liability law that the state supreme court has held “can be satisfied
either by changing a drug’s design or by changing its labeling.” 88
The FDCA similarly requires all drugs to be “safe for use,” which
has been interpreted to require any drug’s “probable therapeutic
benefits” to “outweigh its risk of harm.” 89 The Hatch–Waxman Act,
on the other hand, seeks to usher generic drugs into the market at an
expedited pace, and thus allows generic drugs to be approved without
facing the same level of scrutiny as their identical (in several key
respects) brand-name counterparts that have already been approved
by the FDA. 90 The stipulation is that once a drug is approved, the

82

Id. at 2472.
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S.
Ct. 2466 (2013).
87
Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2473 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A (1965)).
88
Id. at 2474.
89
Id. at 2470–71 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120, 140 (2000)).
90
Id. at 2471. The Hatch–Waxman Act is the popular name for the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat.
83
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generic drug manufacturer can neither make any major changes to the
drug’s composition, nor unilaterally change a drug’s label. 91 Mutual
argued that these federal laws conflicted with state law because
Mutual could not simultaneously comply with both sets of laws,
pointing out that: (a) Mutual could not change the drug’s design as
required under federal law, and (b) Mutual could only satisfy New
Hampshire law by changing its label, which was likewise an
unavailable option under federal law. 92
The First Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with Mutual’s
argument, finding that Congress had demonstrated no intent for
federal law to preempt state tort claims. 93 Additionally, the First
Circuit reasoned that Mutual had a third option: to stop selling the
product in New Hampshire. 94 Accordingly, it affirmed the district
court’s ruling and jury award. 95
The U.S. Supreme Court arrived at the opposite conclusion,
finding that federal law preempted New Hampshire’s tort law. 96 The
Court rejected the First Circuit’s rationale for failing to find
preemption, stating, “Even in the absence of an express pre-emption
provision,” 97 state law may be preempted where a party finds it
“impossible . . . to comply with both state and federal
requirements.” 98 The Court agreed with the First Circuit that Mutual
could not redesign the drug or independently strengthen the label, but
rejected the First Circuit’s suggestion that Mutual had a third option
of “choos[ing] not to make [sulindac] at all.” 99 Therefore, because
Mutual could not satisfy both federal and state law at the same time,

1585 (1984) (codified as 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2012)). Id. The Hatch–
Waxman Act is a supplement to the FDCA. Id. at 2494 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
91
Id. at 2471 (majority opinion).
92
Id. at 2474.
93
Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S.
Ct. 2466 (2013).
94
Id. at 38.
95
Id. at 43, 44.
96
Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2470.
97
Id. at 2473.
98
Id. (quoting English v. Gen. Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79, 110 (1990)).
99
Id. at 2477. The Court then discussed at length that the First Circuit’s “stopselling” rationale was incompatible with “the vast majority—if not all” of the
impossibility preemption cases that the Supreme Court had decided. Id. at 2478.
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the Supremacy Clause rendered New Hampshire’s conflicting law
ineffective. 100
Impact:
Bartlett’s two dissents respectively raised an interesting
administrative law issue that the majority opinion skirted in its
discussion: the role of the FDA in determining whether federal
preemption applied. 101 The FDA conceded that federal preemption
of state law design-defect claims was a “difficult and close” call, but
the agency sustained the position that the FDCA’s misbranding
prohibition preempts state law because “permitting juries to balance
the health risks and benefits of an FDA-approved drug would
undermine” the FDA’s role in maintaining drug safety. 102 Justice
Breyer’s dissent questioned the prudence of affording Skidmore
deference to the FDA’s interpretation, 103 which the majority seemed
to have taken for granted in its wholesale adoption of the rationale set
forth in PLIVA. 104 Justice Breyer’s dissent recognized that the FDA

100

Id. at 2472–73.
Id. at 2481 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2494 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
102
Id. at 2494 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
103
Id. at 2481 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In Skidmore v. Swift & Co., the
Supreme Court established its standard of deferring to an agency’s authority:
101

We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants
may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment
in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
104
The Court extended its ruling in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567
(2011)—i.e., the adoption of the FDA’s interpretation—“that failure-to-warn
claims against generic manufacturers are preempted by the FDCA’s prohibition on
changes to generic drug labels,” to apply to design-defect claims as well without
weighing the strength of the FDA’s interpretation in the present case. Bartlett, 133
S. Ct. at 2476–78.
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generally had expertise in administering drug-related federal statutes,
but rejected giving “special weight to the FDA’s views” here. 105 Not
only did the agency fail to “develop an informed position on the
preemption question” by receiving and evaluating the views of
interested parties (it did not communicate its interpretation through
regulations or the like), but instead offered conflicting views on the
matter in its briefs. 106 Justice Sotomayor’s dissent independently
raised this concern as well, stating that the majority, by “defe[rring]
to an agency’s conclusion that state law is pre-empted,” 107
“replace[d] careful assessment of regulatory structure with an ipse
dixit . . . [that] treat[s] the FDA as the sole guardian of drug
safety.” 108
Bartlett serves as an interesting judicial representation of the
scholastic discussion “of the proper role of agencies and the extent to
which courts owe them deference in preemption cases.”109 The
majority clearly chose to defer to agency views. On one hand, this
decision exemplifies the Court’s recognition that the agency is better
suited than the courts to interpret how state rules impact federal
statutory purposes. 110 On the other hand, the dissent represents the
view that Congress’s intent should hold sway with respect to the
interpretation of federal statutes. 111 The holdings in PLIVA and
Bartlett have strong implications for societal health and drug safety,
as the decisions have broadened the FDA’s scope of regulatory
power, and have established strong precedent that gives weight to the
agency’s ability to dictate the application of federal preemption in the
area of drug regulation.

105

Id. at 2481 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. (stating that “the FDA has set forth conflicting views on this general
matter in different briefs filed at different times”).
107
Id. at 2494 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
108
Id. at 2493.
109
Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1, 44
(2013).
110
Id.
111
See id. at 45 n.282.
106
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UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
Ketchikan Drywall Services, Inc. v.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement,
725 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2013)
Synopsis:
Appellant Ketchikan Drywall Services, Inc. (KDS) sought
review of decisions issued by the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) and the Office of the Chief Administrative
Hearing Officer. 112 ICE determined that KDS committed 271
violations of section 274A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. 113 Subsequently, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found in
favor of ICE on 225 of those claims, affirming that KDS was liable
for a civil penalty of $173,250. 114 The Ninth Circuit applied
Skidmore deference to the Virtue Memorandum 115 and denied KDS’s
petition for review. 116
Facts, Analysis, Ruling:
Section 274A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
requires employers to verify their employees are legally authorized to
work in the United States by filing the Employment Eligibility
Verification Form (I–9 Form). 117 Employers must retain these forms
and provide them for inspection at the request of federal officials. 118

112

Ketchikan Drywall Servs., Inc. v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement,
725 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2013).
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
See infra note 135.
116
Ketchikan Drywall, 725 F.3d at 1108.
117
Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (2012). The “employment verification system”
requires employers to (1) attest under penalty of perjury that the employer has
examined the employee’s documents; (2) attest under the penalty of perjury that the
employee is eligible for employment in the United States; and (3) retain a copy of
the form and “make it available for inspection by officers” of relevant federal
enforcement agencies. Id.
118
Ketchikan Drywall, 725 F.3d at 1108; see 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(2)(ii) (2013)
(“Any person or entity required to retain Forms I–9 in accordance with this section
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KDS, a drywall installation company, employed four fulltime employees and twenty part-time employees. 119 In March 2008,
KDS received a Notice of Inspection and administrative subpoena
requesting its I–9 Forms for employees working from January 1,
2005, to March 25, 2008. 120 KDS responded on April 2, 2008, by
producing some I–9 Forms and other employee verification
documents. 121 In April 2009, KDS received a Notice of Intent to
Fine from ICE. 122 KDS made further production of documents,
which ICE accepted and reviewed. 123 An amended Notice of Intent
to Fine was served on KDS in October 2009, containing 271 total
violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) and 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b) for failure
to provide I–9 Forms for some of the employees, and for incomplete
I–9 Forms for others. 124 KDS was ordered to pay a civil penalty of
$286,624.25. 125
KDS requested a hearing and “produced for the first time
more copies of identification and employment authorization
documents” to the ALJ, who denied consideration of these
documents. 126 The ALJ granted ICE’s motion for summary decision
for 225 violations and granted KDS’s motion for summary decision
on the remaining violations. 127
Upon review before the Ninth Circuit, KDS contended that
many of the 225 violations that the ALJ found were not violations. 128
First, KDS argued that in cases where ICE alleged no I–9 Forms
were provided, KDS complied by presenting them, for the first time,
to the ALJ. 129 Second, KDS insisted that its alleged omissions “were

shall be provided with at least three business days notice prior to an inspection of
Forms I–9 by officers of an authorized agency of the United States.”).
119
Ketchikan Drywall, 725 F.3d at 1108.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 1108–09.
125
Id. at 1109.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
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either minor or could be filled in by reference to the copied
documents” that KDS retained. 130
Based on a plain reading of the text, the Ninth Circuit rejected
KDS’s argument that section 1324a(b)(4) unambiguously allowed
KDS to comply with the employer verification requirements simply
by copying and retaining the documents. 131 Additionally, the court
pointed out that 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(3) spells out the requirement:
“The copying . . . and retention of the copy or electronic image does
not relieve the employer from the requirement to fully complete
section 2 of the Form I–9.” 132
KDS made the alternative argument that, despite its
omissions, it should be treated as in compliance due to the “good
faith” compliance provision, which states that an entity is considered
in compliance “notwithstanding a technical or procedural failure to
meet such requirement if there was a good faith attempt to comply
with the requirement.” 133 To address the merit of this argument, the
court had to define “technical or procedural” violations and thus
looked to Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS) interim
guidelines on the “good faith” compliance provision. 134
The interim guidelines, or the “Virtue Memorandum,” 135 were
promulgated informally in anticipation of formal regulations, and
thus the court found that Chevron deference was improper. 136
Instead, Skidmore deference was proper for a number of reasons. 137
First, judging by the detailed treatment of the provision, the agency
appeared to have considered the issue thoroughly. 138 Moreover, it
defined and distinguished “substantive” violations versus “technical
130

Id.
Id. at 1110–11.
132
Id. at 1111 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(3) (2013)).
133
Id. at 1111 n.7 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(6)(A) (2012)).
134
Id. at 1112.
135
See Memorandum from Paul S. Virtue, INS Acting Exec. Comm’r of
Programs, Interim Guidelines: Section 274A(b)(6) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act Added by Section 411 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (Mar. 6, 1997).
136
Ketchikan Drywall, 725 F.3d at 1112. As the court quoted, interpretations
that “lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style deference.” Id. (quoting
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)).
137
Id. at 1112.
138
Id.
131
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or procedural” violations in a reasonable manner. 139 Additionally,
the agency itself relied on the Virtue Memorandum in enforcing the
employment verification statute for over a decade. 140 Finally, the
agency had relative expertise in determining what constitutes
substantive omissions for I–9 Forms. 141
Relying on the Virtue Memorandum, the court found that
KDS’s violations were “substantive deficiencies” that could not be
excused under the “good faith” compliance provision. 142 KDS’s
failure to check appropriate boxes, despite having available copies of
the relevant documents, constituted substantive violations. 143
Additionally, the untimely offering of relevant documents also
constituted substantive violations, as the Virtue Memorandum
provided that certain substantive deficiencies in the I–9 Forms could
be excused only where the information was presented in the form of a
legible copy at the I–9 inspection along with the I–9 Form itself. 144
Thus, the court held it was proper for the ALJ to refuse to admit the
untimely-produced documents. 145
Impact:
Ketchikan Drywall provides an instance where the agency
exercised its delegated authority to promulgate the law, but not
through a more formal procedure that complies with the
Administrative Procedure Act. As demonstrated by the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis, such informal pronouncements of the law will not
be afforded Chevron deference, but may still compel the court to
accord Skidmore deference in the particular case based on the agency
and the particular interpretation’s combined power of persuasion. 146
139

Id.
Id. at 1112–13.
141
Id. at 1113. Under Skidmore, a court may defer to an agency’s
interpretation, in a particular case, depending on its “power to persuade,” which
“depend[s] upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements.” Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
142
Ketchikan Drywall, 725 F.3d at 1113–15.
143
Id. at 1113.
144
Id. at 1115.
145
Id.
146
See supra notes 136–141.
140
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Gentiva Healthcare Corp. v. Sebelius,
723 F.3d 292 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
Synopsis:
Medicare provider Gentiva Healthcare Corp. (Gentiva)
brought an action against the Secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) for violating the Medicare Integrity
Program statute. 147 The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s
award of summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, holding that
(1) the Secretary “may delegate the ‘sustained or high level of
payment error’ determination to another HHS official” in calculating
overpayment claims, and (2) the merits of the determination were not
subject to judicial review. 148
Facts, Analysis, Ruling:
In 2007, Medicare contractor Cahaba Safeguard
Administrators (Cahaba) initiated a review of reimbursement claims
filed by Gentiva for healthcare services provided between July 1,
2005, and November 30, 2006. 149 Cahaba’s two key findings led it to
believe that Gentiva’s claims “exhibited a ‘sustained or high level of
payment error’”: first, Cahaba found that fifty-eight percent of
Gentiva’s claims under review had been at least partially denied on
the basis of noncompliance with the requirements for Medicare
coverage; 150 and second, Gentiva received a higher payment as
compared to other providers in its region for each beneficiary
served. 151
Cahaba then drew a sample of thirty of Gentiva’s claims and
determined that eighty-seven percent of the sampled claims were
overpaid. 152 Cahaba extrapolated this error rate over all claims and
147

Gentiva Healthcare Corp. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 292, 294 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Id. at 296.
149
Id. at 294.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
148
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determined that Gentiva owed Medicare $4,242,452.10 in
overpayment. 153 Gentiva challenged the payment determination
before an HHS Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and argued that the
sampling and extrapolation method was invalid, which was rejected
by the ALJ. 154
The Medicare Appeals Council of HHS’s Departmental
Appeals Board (Council) subsequently reviewed Gentiva’s appeal of
the ALJ’s approval of Cahaba’s use of extrapolation. 155 The
language of the Medicare Integrity Program 156 statute is written as
follows:
(3) Limitation on use of extrapolation
A medicare contractor may not use
extrapolation to determine overpayment amounts to be
recovered by recoupment, offset, or otherwise unless
the Secretary determines that—
(A) there is a sustained or high level of
payment error; or
(B) documented educational intervention has
failed to correct the payment error.
There shall be no administrative or judicial review
under section 1395ff of this title, section 1395oo of
this title, or otherwise, of determinations by the
Secretary of sustained or high levels of payment errors
under this paragraph. 157
Gentiva argued that, under this statute, the Secretary was required to
personally make a determination of a sustained or high level of

153

Id.
Id.
155
Id.
156
The Medicare Integrity Program was created by the Deficit Reduction Act
of 2005 under § 1936 of the Social Security Act. Medicaid Integrity Program–
General Information, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/Medicare-MedicaidCoordination/FraudPrevention/MedicaidIntegrityProgram/index.html?redirect=/medicaidintegrityprogr
am (last updated Aug. 30, 2013). The purpose of the program is to “prevent and
reduce provider fraud, waste, and abuse in the $300 billion per year Medicare
program.” Id.
157
42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(f)(3) (2006).
154
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payment error before extrapolation could be used. 158 The Council
rejected this reading as “unduly narrow,” as § 1395kk(a) had given
the Secretary “broad authority” to contract her administrative duties
for the Medicare program. 159 Additionally, the Council found that
the determination was valid. 160
Gentiva appealed the decision in federal district court, where
the court applied the Chevron analysis and granted summary
judgment for the Secretary. 161 Applying the first step of Chevron to
the issue of whether the Secretary could legally subdelegate her
authority to determine if extrapolation was warranted, the court found
that there was no “explicit indication” that the Secretary’s “sustained
or high level of payment error” determination could not be delegated
to contractors. 162 Applying the second step of Chevron, it was
reasonable for the Secretary to interpret § 1395ddd(f)(3) as
permitting her to subdelegate that determination function, and thus
the agency’s position was warranted deference. 163 Finally, the court
held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear Gentiva’s challenge of
the determination based on § 1395ddd(f)(3)’s language: “There shall
be no administrative or judicial review . . . of determinations by the
Secretary of sustained or high levels of payment errors.” 164
Gentiva appealed the district court’s findings and the D.C.
Circuit reviewed the issues de novo. 165 The circuit court agreed with
the lower court that the Secretary’s construction of § 1395ddd(f)(3)
should be deferred to because the statute was ambiguous and the

158

Gentiva, 723 F.3d at 294.
Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395kk(a) (“The Secretary may perform any of his
functions under this subchapter directly, or by contract providing for payment in
advance or by way of reimbursement, and in such installments, as the Secretary
may deem necessary.”).
160
Gentiva, 723 F.3d at 294.
161
Id. at 294–95. Under Chevron, the court asks two questions: first, “whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue”; and second, “if the
statute is silent or ambiguous” as to the issue, “whether the agency’s answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
162
Gentiva, 723 F.3d at 295.
163
Id.
164
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(f)(3)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
165
Id.
159

Spring 2014

Legal Summaries

255

Secretary’s interpretation was reasonable. 166 The circuit court
rejected Gentiva’s argument that the statute unambiguously required
the Secretary herself to make the “sustained or high level of payment
error” determination because the statute provided that “[a] medicare
contractor . . . may use extrapolation” and, in the same sentence,
stated that “the Secretary” makes the determination of whether
extrapolation may be used. 167 Instead, the court stated, “‘Secretary’
does not always means ‘Secretary’” because she may delegate the
determination to another HHS official, and, under § 1395kk(a), she
may even delegate to non-government actors by contract. 168 Thus,
the court held that the statute did not unambiguously require the
Secretary to make the determination herself; it was reasonable for the
Secretary to construe the statute as permissive towards her delegation
of this duty. 169
Finally, the D.C. Circuit agreed with the district court that the
jurisdictional limits provided in the statute—that “[t]here shall be no
administrative or judicial review . . . of determinations by the
Secretary of sustained or high levels of payment errors”—barred the
court’s review of the merits of the “sustained or high level of
payment error” determination. 170 The court, reiterating its holding
that the Secretary may delegate the job of making such
determinations to contractors, rejected Gentiva’s argument that the
review limitation applies only when the Secretary makes the
determination. 171 The district court’s summary judgment for the
Secretary was affirmed. 172
Impact:
This case reaffirmed the Secretary’s power to subdelegate her
Medicare functions and contractor’s authority to carry out
overpayment determinations and use those calculations to extrapolate
the amount of overpayment. In the decision, the court explained that
166

Id.
Id. at 295–96.
168
Id. at 296.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 297; 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(f)(3) (2006).
171
Gentiva, 723 F.3d at 297.
172
Id.
167
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“although [the court] believe[d] Gentiva may have the better reading
of § 1395ddd(f)(3),” the court must defer to the Secretary because the
statute was ambiguous and the Secretary’s reading was reasonable. 173
Additionally, the court found that it did not have jurisdiction to
review the determinations, even where the duty of making the
determination had been delegated to another entity. 174 This was a
straightforward application of Chevron, 175 and perhaps a suitable
one. As then Judge Breyer of the First Circuit explained,
[T]he more closely related to the everyday
administration of the statute and to the agency's (rather
than the court's) administrative or substantive
expertise, the less likely it is that Congress (would
have) “wished” or “expected” the courts to remain
indifferent to the agency's views. 176
This case appears to be highly consistent with Justice Breyer’s
guidance. The Secretary’s duty of determining a “sustained or high
level of payment error” was precisely prescribed by Congress and
closely related to the Secretary’s mandate to administer the Medicare
Integrity Program, which is within the HHS’s administrative
expertise. As such, it was reasonable and proper for the court to
defer to the agency’s interpretation of the relevant statute.

Mortgage Bankers Ass’n v. Harris,
720 F.3d 966 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
Synopsis:
Appellant Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) brought suit
against the Secretary of the Department of Labor (DOL) for violating
the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) notice and comment

173

Id. at 296.
Id. at 297.
175
See supra note 161.
176
Mayburg v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 740 F.2d 100, 106 (1st Cir.
1984).
174
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rulemaking procedure. 177
The DOL had issued an agency
interpretation by way of an opinion letter posted in response to the
MBA’s inquiry in 2006, and later reversed its interpretation in 2010
by issuing an Administrator’s Interpretation. 178 The new rule
provided that mortgage loan officers were not exempt from federal
overtime laws. 179 The district court granted summary judgment
against MBA, holding that MBA failed to demonstrate the APA
procedure had been triggered by MBA’s “substantial and justified
reliance” on the new regulation. 180 The D.C. Circuit reversed the
summary judgment, holding that such reliance was not a separate and
independent element of the circuit’s two-part analysis. 181
Facts, Analysis, Ruling:
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was enacted in 1938 by
Congress to ensure that employees who work more than forty hours
per week are paid overtime wages, unless they are covered by an
exemption provided in the Act. 182 Section 213(a)(1) provides that
employees who are “employed in a bona fide executive,
administrative, or professional capacity . . . or in the capacity of
outside salesman (as such terms are defined and delimited from time
to time by regulations of the Secretary)” are considered exempt from
the overtime pay requirement. 183 FLSA is administered by the Wage
and Hour Division of the DOL, which is also responsible for
promulgating regulations that define and interpret the scope of
FLSA’s exemptions. 184 As a matter of practice, the DOL issues
opinion letters through its website and electronic legal research
databases 185 to announce its interpretation of FLSA. 186 Opinion
177

Mortg. Bankers Ass’n v. Harris, 720 F.3d 966, 968 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id. at 969.
181
Id. at 972.
182
Mortgage Bankers Ass’n v. Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d 193, 195–96 (D.D.C.
2012), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n v. Harris, 720 F.3d 966
(D.C. Cir. 2013).
183
Id. at 196 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2012)).
184
Id.
185
See Wage and Hour Division (WHD) Rulings and Interpretations, U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/opinion.htm (last visited Mar.
178
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letters are typically in response “to inquiries from private parties
seeking guidance about the application of the FLSA to their business
activities.” 187
In 2006, the DOL issued an opinion letter (2006 Opinion
Letter) responding to MBA’s inquiry regarding whether or not its
2200 member companies were required to pay their mortgage loan
officers overtime. 188
Mortgage loan officers “typically assist
prospective borrowers in identifying and then applying for various
mortgage offerings.” 189 MBA had asked the DOL whether such
employees who “spent less than fifty percent of their working time
on ‘customer-specific persuasive sales activity’” were considered
exempt. 190 In the 2006 Opinion Letter, the DOL relied on its 2004
regulations 191 in declaring that mortgage loan officers, based on the
facts presented by MBA, 192 satisfied the elements of the
administrative exemption. 193 Addressing the second prong of the
2004 regulations codified under 29 C.F.R. part 541, the DOL
clarified in the 2006 Opinion Letter that “work directly related to the
management or general business operations of their employer or their
employer’s customers” was different from “working on a
11, 2014). The website offers updates of the WHD Administrator’s interpretations
and rulings as well as withdrawals of previous interpretations and rulings made on
the basis of new statutes, regulations, and case law. Id. “Note that rulings and
interpretations may be affected by changes to the applicable statute or regulations.”
Id.
186
Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 197.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 198.
189
Harris, 720 F.3d at 968.
190
Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 198.
191
See Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative,
Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122 (Apr.
23, 2004) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 541). The administrative exemption of FLSA
applies to an employee: (1) compensated on a salary or fee basis at a rate of not less
than $455 per week; (2) whose primary duty is the performance of office or nonmanual work directly related to the management or general business operations of
the employer or the employer’s customers; and (3) whose primary duty includes the
exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of
significance. Id.
192
Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 199. The letter specifically stated that its opinion
was “based exclusively on the facts and circumstances” presented in MBA’s
request. Id.
193
Id.
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manufacturing production line or selling a product in a retail or
service establishment.” 194 The mortgage loan officers satisfied this
prong because they had primary duties “other than sales,” which
required them to collect and analyze financial information to provide
specially-tailored advice to customers about mortgage loans and the
risks and benefits of each mortgage loan alternative for the particular
customer. 195 The 2006 Opinion Letter additionally stated, the fact
that mortgage loan officers used software programs or tools in
providing such services, did not disqualify them under the third
prong of the test—the requirement that the exempt employee exercise
discretion and independent judgment as part of the employee’s
primary duties. 196 MBA’s members allegedly relied on this letter and
classified their mortgage loan officers as exempt from FLSA’s
overtime law. 197
In March 2010, the Acting Administrator of the Wage and
Hour Division issued an Administrator Interpretation sua sponte
(2010 Administrator Interpretation), 198 without implementing the
APA’s notice and comment process. 199 The 2010 Administrator
Interpretation specifically addressed whether a typical mortgage loan
officer’s duties fit the second prong of the test, i.e., the primary duty
of “office or non-manual work directly related to the management or
general business operations of their employer or their employer’s
customers.” 200 It defined the second prong to include work that
services the business itself, including “accounting, budgeting, quality
control, purchasing, advertising, research, human resources, labor
relations, and similar areas.” 201 As such, where mortgage loan
officers’ primary duties were to “sell[] loans directly to individual
194

Id. at 198, 199.
Id. at 199.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id. Administrator Interpretations are issued at the Administrator’s
discretion when the WHD wishes to “set forth a general interpretation of the law
and regulations, applicable across-the-board,” as it is a more “efficient and
productive” way of providing guidance than issuing fact-specific opinion letters,
“where a slight difference in the assumed facts may result in a different outcome.”
WHD Rulings and Interpretations, supra note 185.
199
Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 201.
200
Id. at 199.
201
Id.
195

260

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

34-1

customers, one loan at a time,” the administrative exemption did not
apply to them. 202
MBA filed suit in federal district court in January 2011
against the DOL for violating the APA’s notice and comment
rulemaking requirement through its issue of the 2010 Administrator
Interpretation. 203 MBA sought to have the 2010 Administrator
Interpretation “vacat[ed] and set aside” and to have the DOL
enjoined from enforcing it. 204 Under D.C. Circuit law, an agency is
“required to use notice and comment procedures” if the interpretation
of a regulation “itself carries the force and effect of law.” 205 This
procedure is triggered when two elements are met: where the agency
has made “definitive interpretations” and in doing so, made “a
significant change” to its rule.206 However, the district court agreed
with the DOL that MBA’s alleged reliance on the 2006 Opinion
Letter was not “substantial and justifiable reliance on a wellestablished agency interpretation” and found for the DOL on
summary judgment. 207
The particular issue in contention between MBA and the
DOL that came before the D.C. Circuit’s three-judge panel was
whether D.C. case law had added another element to the analysis.208
The DOL argued that MBA had to meet a third element of
“substantial and justified reliance” to trigger the requirement of the
notice and comment procedure. 209 The D.C. Circuit disagreed with
the DOL’s reading of the cases and held that “reliance” was merely
202

Id. at 200 (citing Casas v. Conseco Fin. Corp., No. Civ. 00–1512, 2002 WL
507059 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2002)). The 2010 Administrator Interpretation cited
other cases in support of this conclusion that mortgage loan officers are nonexempt employees. See Nancy J. Leppink, Administrator’s Interpretation No.
OF
LABOR
WHD
(Mar.
24,
2010),
2010–1,
U.S.
DEP’T
http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FLSA/2010/FLSAAI2010_1.pdf.
203
Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 201.
204
Id.
205
Id. at 204.
206
Harris, 720 F.3d at 969. The test originated from Paralyzed Veterans of
America v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
207
Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 208. The court noted that the only type of reliance
that MBA had cited was that between 2006 and 2010 mortgage loan officers had
“become accustomed to the freedom to control their own hours and breaks” under
their status as exempt employees. Id.
208
Harris, 720 F.3d at 967–68.
209
Id. at 968–69.
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part of the first element inquiry of whether there was a definitive
interpretation. 210 In oral argument, the DOL conceded that the first
and second elements of the analysis had already been met—namely,
there were two definitive and conflicting agency interpretations. 211
Having fulfilled the two elements of the analysis, the D.C. Circuit
ordered the district court to vacate the DOL’s 2010 Administrator
Interpretation. 212
Impact:
When formulating regulations, agencies are required to follow
the APA’s notice and comment procedure, which applies to “repeals”
and “amendments” of those regulations.213 The D.C. Circuit is
perhaps unique in adding “change an interpretation of a regulation”
to that list. 214 Paralyzed Veterans of America and its progeny in the
D.C. Circuit have established that where an agency makes a
significant revision to an earlier “definitive interpretation,” the
agency has “in effect amended its rule,” which requires notice and
comment. 215 The D.C. Circuit approach reflects a pushback against
the familiar practice of deferring to agency interpretation following
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. and Bowles v. Seminole Rock &
Sand Co. 216 In reaffirming its strict two-element test for evaluating
210

Id. at 971 (“[W]e have always considered it as part of the first element.”).
Id. at 968.
212
Id. at 972.
213
Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
214
Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock
Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 79
(2000).
215
Michael Asimow & Robert A. Anthony, A Second Opinion? Inconsistent
Interpretive Rules, 25 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 16 (Winter 2000). Some
commentators, such as Asimow and Anthony, are highly critical of the D.C.
Circuit’s approach, believing it violates APA § 553(b)(A)’s exemption for
interpretive rules. Id. The relevant provision states that the notice and comment
procedure does not apply “to interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or
rules of agency organization, procedure or practice.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A)
(2012).
216
See Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 584–85 (discussing concerns that such
deference “arguably creates perverse incentives for an agency to draft vague
211
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changes in agency interpretations, the D.C. Circuit advances its
purported goal of encouraging greater accountability in the
interpretation of regulations. 217 What remains to be seen is the
impact on venue selection for agencies and regulated entities alike. 218

regulations that give inadequate guidance” in order to circumvent the notice and
comment process required by the APA). For the two Supreme Court cases, see
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984), and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
217
See id. at 584 (“[The Court] is certainly not open to an agency to
promulgate mush and then give it concrete form only through subsequent less
formal ‘interpretations.’”).
218
See Angstreich, supra note 214, at 121. Angstreich explains that agencies
try to avoid amending regulations by bringing enforcement actions in circuits that
agree with their interpretations. Id. However, as “regulatory statutes permit appeal
to the D.C. Circuit in addition to the circuit or circuits in which the party seeking
review transacts business,” litigants challenging the interpretations are more likely
to appeal to the D.C. Circuit, as that circuit’s analysis makes a finding of
“amendment” more accessible. Id. at 122.

